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Comparative Negligence
in California
Li v. Yellow Cab Company: A Survey
Of California Practice Under
Comparative Negligence
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ*
On March 31, 1975, in the case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,' the
Supreme Court of California gave birth to a brand new baby for
the state-pure comparative negligence. The birth may have been a
multiple one in that the introduction of comparative negligence repre-
sents much more than the abolition of the absolute contributory negli-
gence defense. Indeed it has the potential of affecting and changing
many other doctrines of tort law. Moreover, the nature of this new
child will be substantially affected by the preexisting tort law of the
state. For example, if California generally permitted contribution
among joint tortfeasors, comparative negligence would have one effect;
on the other hand, if California sharply limited contribution among joint
tortfeasors, as it does now,2 comparative negligence may bring about a
different result.
* J.D., 1965, Columbia University School of Law; Professor of Law, University
of Cincinnati; Author, CowAaAXIvE NEGLIENcE (1974); Co-author, PRossM, WADE
AN ScHwAxi77, CAsEs AND MATEEuLs oN Tois (6th ed. 1976).
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). The Li opinion
was modified by the supreme court on April 24, 1975. For a discussion of that
modification see note 91 infra.
2. See CAL. CoDB Civ. PRoc. §§428.10, 875.
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The purpose of this article is to acquaint the practitioner and student
with some of the most important issues that will be faced by the
California legal community as a result of the Li decision's potential
impact on existing California tort law. Although no one can absolutely
predict the ultimate resolution of the issues to be discussed herein,
strong indicia can be gleaned from the decisions and statutes of other
jurisdictions which have adopted some form of a comparative negligence
system. The author has pursued a long and exhaustive study of all
aspects of comparative negligence in light of tort law in all states. As a
result of this research, he has attempted to identify and pose possible
solutions to the intricate network of problems raised by the introduction
of comparative negligence in California.
A PUPE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM
It is important to begin with an understanding of the nature and
problems unique to a pure comparative negligence system. As the
reader should be aware, the supreme court in the Li case selected a pure
comparative negligence system for California.3 Under a pure system a
contributorily negligent plaintiff recovers some damages unless his negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of the harm that befell him.4 Only
a few other states have adopted this type of system.5 New York
statutorily adopted a pure comparative negligence system on September
1, 1975;1 Florida adopted pure comparative negligence by judicial
decision in 1973,7 while Washington and Rhode IslandO selected this
system a few years before that. Only Mississippi'0 (since 1910) and
the Federal Employer's Liability Act" (since 1908) have had a pure
system for a long period of time and, on occasion, these precedents will
provide helpful information to the practitioner.
A pure comparative negligence system is rather easy to apply. Ap-
portionment of damages is made on the basis of proximately caused
fault, and not pure physical causation. 2  Theoretically, plaintiff can
3. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874.
4. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF, THE LAW OF ToRTs §67 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; V. SCHWAR17, COmPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §3.2, at 46
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ScnwARz]; see BooK oF APPROvED JURY INSTRUCTONS,
No. 14.91 et seq. (5th rev. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BAll].
5. See ScHWARIZ, supra note 4, at 46-48.
6. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §1411 (McKinney 1975-76).
7. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
8. WAsH. LAws 1973 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 138, §1.
9. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 1956, §9-20-4 (1975 Supp.).
10. Miss. LAws Special Sess. 1910, Ch. 135.
11. Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, §3, 35 Stat. 66, 45 U.S.C. §53.
12. For example, an intoxicated motorcyclist speeds down a highway at 25 miles an
hour over the speed limit. He loses control of his vehicle, crosses over the center divider
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recover damages as long as defendant's negligence contributed to the
happening of the accident. For example, if plaintiff suffers $10,000
damages and is determined by the jury to be 40 percent at fault, he
recovers $6000. Those who oppose a pure comparative negligence
system sometimes pose the case of a plaintiff who was 95 percent at
fault and ends up recovering damages from a defendant who was only 5
percent at fault. This situation may be more conjectural than real, for
in all the years that Mississippi has had the pure comparative negligence,
no case of this nature has arisen.
If such a case did arise, there is an argument by which a defendant
may still be able to avoid liability. Where a plaintiff was extraordinarily
more at fault than defendant in causing an accident, it can be argued
that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident
and that defendant' s negligence, if any, was remote. This argument was
successfully made to a jury in a Mississippi auto accident case wherein
plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused by defendant's failure to
observe the former's auto at a crossroad.' 3 The defendant completely
avoided liability by successfully demonstrating that the accident was
caused solely by the plaintiff's act of proceeding through a stop signal.' 4
On the other hand, if this type of argument is extended too far, "proxi-
mate cause" may well become a substitute for the pass6 contributory
negligence defense, and courts should be wary that this defense tactic
does not subvert the basic philosophy of the comparative negligence
system.
An even stronger argument may be made if defense counsel can
demonstrate that defendant's negligent conduct was not a cause-in-fact
of plaintiffs injury. For example, suppose the plaintiff claims that
defendant's negligence was based on his failure to signal when making a
left turn. If defense counsel can prove that plaintiff would not have
seen the signal even if it had been given, the alleged negligence was not
a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's harm and there will be no apportionment of
damages. In addition, there is no danger of this type of defense
becoming a substitute for contributory negligence, for if the defendant's
acts were not a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injuries, there is no need to
consider whether plaintiff's actions contributed to his own injuries.
line, and collides with a large truck traveling ten miles an hour over the speed limit. The
motorcyclist is killed and his motorcycle is demolished. In terms of pure physical
causation, an expert may conclude that 95 percent of the force that killed the motorcycl-
ist was supplied by the truck. However, under a comparative negligence system, the jury
does not focus on physical causation; rather, it considers and measures the culpability of
the truck driver. ScHwAnrz, supra note 4, at 276.
13. Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611 (1958).
14. Id. at 805, 100 So. 2d at 612.
749
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Hence, the need for early and complete investigation of an accident case
becomes more important than it ever was before.
The other basic form of comparative negligence is a modified form
wherein the contributory negligence defense becomes operative after a
certain amount of fault is attributed to the plaintiff, usually 50 per-
cent. 15 Because there is no such demarcation with a pure comparative
negligence system, the question of whether setoffs will be allowed under
the latter type of system becomes crucial. For example, suppose there
has been a two-car collision wherein plaintiff suffered $10,000 worth of
damges and was 40 percent at fault. As we have seen previously, he
would collect $6000. But suppose that defendant was also injured and
suffered $10,000 of damages. By definition, he was 60 percent at fault,
but he also has a potential recovery of $4000. If setoffs are permitted,
plaintiff will only be entitled to $2000 and defendant will recover
nothing.
An old California appellate case which has not been overruled, Mur-
phy v. Davids,'8 stated that "[ifn every case the suitor has the right to
ask for a setoff, and in every proper case as of right the motion should
be granted. This is a power which exists independent of statute, and
rests upon the general jurisdiction of courts over their suitors and
processes.' 7 Moreover, Section 666 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure indicates that when an amount established in a cross com-
plaint exceeds the demand established by plaintiff, judgment must be
given to defendant "for the excess." Thus, in the absence of some
statute or modifying legal principle, setoffs may well be allowed in
California. This procedure is presently being followed by the courts of
Mississippi."" On the other hand, the Rhode Island pure comparative
negligence statute contains a provision that "there shall be no setoff of
damages between the respective parties."'19 It should be noted that this
statute is not limited to insurance cases, and prevents 'any party from
applying for a setoff.
The matter of setoffs will probably have to be left to legislative
determination. In that regard, one commentator has suggested that
under a pure comparative negligence system, casualty insurance compa-
nies should be prohibited from obtaining setoffs for their insureds.20
15. See ScHwARMsz supra note 4, §3.5.
16. 55 Cal. App. 416, 203 P. 802 (1921).
17. Id. at 421, 203 P. at 804.
18. See Johnson v. Richardson, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194 (1959).
19. R.I. GENx. LAws ANN. 1956, §9-20-4.1 (1975 Supp.).
20. Flynn, Comparative Negligence: The Debate, 8 TRAL MAoAzNE 49, 52
(May/June 1972).
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Since there never has been such a statute enacted in any state, the
constitutionality of that proposal remains untested.
One final note with regard to a pure system: it is still the defendant's
responsibility to both plead and prove contributory negligence. He
probably will not have to allege a specific percentage; however, it will be
enough if he indicates that the negligence of the plaintiff has substantial-
ly contributed to the happening of the accident.
PRIOR LIMITATIONS ON THE
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE
In years prior to the Li case, courts in California developed a number
of rules that limited the harshness of the contributory negligence de-
fense. The continued viability of these rules is now questionable in
light of the Li decision. The following discussion will focus on these
judicially-created doctrines and the possible impact of pure comparative
negligence thereupon.
A. The Last Clear Chance Doctrine
Under the traditional contributory negligence system, the contributory
negligence defense could be avoided where the defendant had the "last
clear chance" to prevent the accident from occurring. This could arise
where the plaintiff was either inattentive or helpless, and the defendant,
knowing of this situation and reasonably able to avoid it, failed to do
SO.21 The court in the Li case did a favor for those members of the bar
who desire clarity in that it specifically said that the doctrine of last clear
chance will no longer be applicable in California22 since the need for
that doctrine no longer exists once comparative negligence is the law.2"
On the other hand, the question of ;vhether last clear chance will "sur-
vive! comparative negligence has plagued other jurisdictions that have
legislatively enacted a comparative negligence system.
Defense counsel should be pleased that the Li court accepted the view
that retention of last clear chance would only result "in a windfall to the
plaintiff in direct contravention of the principle of liability in proportion
to fault. ' 24 Thus, defendant will no longer have to pay total damages
when he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident; rather, the
damages will be reduced by the amount that the plaintiff was at fault. Of
course, where the defendant did have the last opportunity to avoid the
accident, the percentage of his fault may be increased accordingly.
21. PRossER, supra note 4, §66.
22. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875.
23. Id. at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
24. id.
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B. The Wilful and Wanton Defendant
A second limitation on the contributory negligence defense under
prior California law concerned the "wilful and wanton" defendant.
Under this limitation, if the plaintiff proved that the defendant acted
wilfully or with reckless disregard for the consequences of his own
action, the contributory negligence defense would be avoided.25 Will
this doctrine still prevail after comparative negligence? The Li court
hedged on this point, stating arguments both ways. On the one hand, it
referred to the late Dean Prosser's view that the wilfull and wanton
defendant should still have to pay full damages because his negligence is
different in kind rather than in degree from that of the plaintiff.23 On
the other hand, it is the author's view that sharp lines of distinction
cannot be drawn among negligence, gross negligence, and wilful and
wanton misconduct; fault increases quantitatively. The Li court alluded
to this position also and may accept it eventually.27  In that regard,
apportioning fault when the defendant has acted wilfully and wantonly
will be in harmony with the way the court handled the last clear chance
doctrine. By apportioning fault between the parties, the court will
adhere to "the principle of liability in proportion to fault." 28  It is
important to note that the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions of
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (hereinafter referred to as
the Baji Committee) refrained from expressing any opinion on the effect
of contributory negligence where defendant's misconduct has been
short of intentional, that is, reckless or grossly negligent. However, it
did provide an -applicable instruction should the attorney conclude wilful
misconduct does bar consideration of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence.29
There is one special problem under California law with respect to the
wilful and wanton defendant. In some case law definitions of this term,
the "intentional" actor appears to -be included.30 When the defendant
has acted intentionally, that is, with the purpose to cause the harm or
with knowledge that the end result is substantially certain to occur, the
plaintiff's "contributory negligence" should be immaterial and he should
25. Aelletti v. Membrila, 234 Cal. App. 2d 606, 44 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1965); Cawog
v. Rothbaom, 165 Cal. App. 2d 577, 331 P.2d 1063 (1958); see BAJI, supra note 4, No.
3.52.
26. 13 Cal. 3d at 825, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873, 532 P.2d at 1241; see also PRossnR,
supra note 4, at 426.
27. Id. For a lengthy discussion of this concept, see ScHwARTz, supra note 4,
§§5.1-5.5.
28. Id. at 825-26, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
29. See BAJI, supra note 4, No. 3.52 and "USE NOTE" following.
30. E.g., Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co., 58 Cal. 2d 916, 918, 376 P.2d 833,
834, 26 Cal. Rptr. 769, 770 (1962).
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recover his entire damages. For example, if defendant committed a
battery on plaintiff, the latter's damages should not be reduced because
he was "contributorily negligent" in failing to duck. 1 This position has
been expressly adopted by the Baji Committee." Hence, a plaintiff's
attorney should always be watchful for the opportunity to characterize a
defendant's actions as "intentional" rather than as merely "negligent,"
thereby avoiding a reduction of the plaintiff's award for damages.38
C. Violation of Statute
There was a third doctrine-not adverted to by the Supreme Court of
California in Li-under which plaintiff's contributory negligence was
ignored. This doctrine applied in two specific instances where defend-
ant had violated a statute. The first instance arose in the simple
situation where a statute specifically so provided. An example may be
found under the Federal Employers Liability Act which states in part
that "no such employee . . . shall be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to
the injury or death of such employee."34 Under comparative negligence,
the plaintiff's contributory negligence will still be immaterial in such a
situation.
The second instance where the contributory negligence defense was
ignored was more subtle. It arose when a court determined that a
defendant violated a statute that was intended to protect persons in
plaintiff's class against their own inability to protect themselves.35 Stat-
utes of this type include those which prohibit: (1) the sale of alcohol to
intoxicated persons;3 6 (2) the sale of firearms to minors;3 7 and (3) the
employment of minors in dangerous occupations.38
Will this absolute avoidance of the contributory negligence defense
continue after the Li case in this latter situation where a statute has been
violated? The answer to that question is uncertain, but two lines of
argument could be pursued. On the one hand, it could be argued that a
basic reason for the old rule was to mitigate the contributory negligence
31. See Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960) (battery); see
also Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
32. BAJI, supra note 4, No. 3.52.
33. For a more detailed discussion, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, §5.2.
34. 45 U.S.C. §53 (1971).
35. See generally ScwARTz, supra note 4, §6.2.
36. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25602; see Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486
P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
37. See CAL. PEN. CODE §12551.
38. E.g., CAL. IA1OR CODE §§1294, 1308; see Boyles v. Hamilton, 235 Cal. App.
2d 492, 45 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1965); Tesche v. Best Concrete Products, Inc., 160 Cal. App.
2d 256, 325 P.2d 150 (1958).
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defense. In that regard, the doctrine was similar to last clear chance.
There is some support for this position in Wisconsin decisions. For
example, in Presser v. Seisel Construction Co.,89 a construction worker
at a Nike missile base fell into a pit that was left unguarded in violation
of a "Safe Place to Work" statute.40 Plaintiff argued that his contribu-
tory negligence should not be subject to apportionment; rather, he
should have a full recovery.4 Plaintiff relied on a New York case that
had held that a worker's contributory negligence was immaterial when
defendant had violated a similar law. 41 The Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin distinguished the New York case in part on the ground that "[iln
New York contributory negligence is a complete bar to the action
whereas in Wisconsin under the comparative negligence statute . . .
[it] is not."43
On the other hand, plaintiff could argue in this specific situation that
the court should totally ignore any contributory negligence on the part
of plaintiff on the premise that the legislature intended such a result.
The recent Minnesota case of Zerby v. Warren"4 would appear to lend
support to this position. In Zerby, a state statute prohibited the sale of
toxic glue to persons under the age of nineteen unless the glue was
contained in "a packaged kit for the construction of a model automo-
bile, airplane, or similar item."45 Defendant violated this statute when
he sold Steven Zerby, a fourteen year old, two pints of the proscribed
glue. A friend of the youth inhaled fumes from the glue, injuring his
central nervous system, which caused him to fall in a creek and drown.4"
The Minnesota court construed the purpose of the safety statute as pro-
tecting minors unable to exercise self-protective care from sniffing fumes
from glue 47 and held that the enactment of comparative negligence in the
state did not alter the exclusion of the contributory negligence defense in
that precise situation.48 In summary, the situation was different in
principle from either the last clear chance or wilful and wanton defend-
ant situations discussed previously.
INTERACTION WITH PREEXISTING TORT DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding the introduction of comparative negligence as a
replacement for the old contributory negligence system, some of the
39. 19 Wis. 2d 54, 119 N.W.2d 405 (1963).
40. Id. at 57-58, 119 N.W.2d at 407-08.
41. Id. at 64-65, 119 N.W.2d at 411.
42. Id. at 65, 119 N.W.2d at 411.
43. Id. at 66, 119 N.W.2d at 411.
44. 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
45. Id. at 138, 210 N.W.2d at 61.
46. Id. at 137, 210 N.W.2d at 61.
47. Id. at 140, 210 N.W.2d at 62; see also MINN. STATS. § 145.38 (subd. 1).
48. 297 Minn. at 140, 210 N.W.2d at 63.
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most perplexing problems occur when a comparative negligence system
is integrated with preexisting tort doctrine. In the sections to follow,
the author discusses some of the major interactions that will be of
particular importance in California.
A. Assumption of Risk
The assumption of risk defense is divided into express and implied
assumption of risk. Under the doctrine of express assumption of risk,
an individual agrees orally or in writing to hold another individual
blameless in the event the assumed risk causes injury. A common
example is found in waivers signed by customers in beauty or barber
schools. Express assumption of risk is an absolute defense and should
remain such after comparative negligence. The new Baji Committee
instructions now reflect this policy.49
The form of :assumption of risk defense that is most common is not
express, but implied. The implied assumption of risk defense is estab-
lished when defendant shows that plaintiff voluntarily encountered a
known risk.50 However, this defense presents a great problem after the
introduction of comparative negligence. Win it remain as an absolute
defense or will damages be apportioned? The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in the Li case fortunately supplied some guidance on this issue:
,[T]he adoption of a system of comparative negligence should en-
tail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general
scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those
particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved
is no more than a varient of contributory negligence.51
This means that where a plaintiff has unreasonably assumed a risk, as
when plaintiff voluntarily rides in an automobile with a driver known to
be intoxicated, his conduct will not totally bar his claim; rather, his fault
will be taken into account and utilized to reduce the amount of his
recovery.
However, this is not the approach being utilized in all jurisdictions
which have adopted a comparative negligence system. Many state
courts have held that an unreasonable assumption of risk can act as a
complete defense to plaintiff's recovery,52 leaving the ultimate determi-
49. BAR, supra note 4, No. 4.30.
SO. See PROSSER, supra note 4, §68 at 440.
51. 13 Cal. 3d at 825, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
52. See, e.g., Spradlin v. Klump, 244 Ark. 841, 427 S.W.2d 542 (1968); Bugh v.
Webb, 231 Ark. 27, 328 S.W.2d 379 (1959); Roberts v. King, 102 Ga. App. 518, 116
S.E.2d 885 (1960); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Mason v. W.
Power & Gas Co., 183 Neb. 392, 160 N.W.2d 204 (1968); Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D.
406, 92 N.W.2d 654 (195F).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 7
nation of plaintiff's unreasonableness to the jury. Hopefully, this ap-
proach will not be adopted in California. Of course, defense counsel
should always be alert to the situation where the plaintiff's unreasonable
conduct is the sole cause of his injuries. On the other hand, when the
plaintiff has reasonably assumed a risk, as when plaintiff sits in an area
of a baseball stadium that has no protective screening, his conduct will
not be considered as "fault" under comparative negligence. Rather, the
court will decide whether the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff
by not providing a protective screening or warning him of the risks
involved.53 If the trier-of-fact concludes that the defendant discharged
his duty, the defendant will win the case. On the other hand, if it is
concluded that the defendant should have done more, plaintiff's conduct
of sitting in the open area will have no effect on his claim. Obviously,
this matter is quite conceptual and involves careful study of each case
wherein this issue arises.54 However, counsel for both parties must
always be wary of its possible application to the particular case under
consideration.
B. Strict Liability
The Li opinion, which was concerned with a typical automobile
negligence case, contained no discussion of strict liability. In its April
24th modification of the opinion, the court in a number of places
deleted the word "fault" and substituted the word "negligence," perhaps
indicating that it did not intend for its holding to apply to strict liability.
Further, in a footnote of the modified opinion the court stated that
"[i]n employing the generic term 'fault' throughout this opinion we
follow a usage common to the literature on the subject of comparative
negligence. In all cases, however, we intend the term to import nothing
more than 'negligence' in the accepted legal sense. ' 5 Thus, the court
was careful not to venture into the land of strict liability. What will
happen in a strict liability case where the claim is based either on a
defective product or in an abnormally dangerous activity? In light of
the Li court's avoidance of this issue we are left to speculation and case
law from other jurisdictions. It does seem likely, however, that compar-
ative negligence principles will ultimately be used by California courts in
strict liability cases. Instead of references to "comparative negligence,"
53. See Lee v. National League Baseball Club of Milwaukee, 4 Wis. 2d 168, 89
N.W.2d 811 (1958) (dictum); cf. Hoar v. Sherburne Corp., 327 F. Supp. 570 (D. Vt.
1971).
54. For a complete discussion of the concept of assumption of risk in a comparative
negligence system, see ScrwARTnz, supra note 4, §§9.1-9.5.
55. 13 Cal. 3d at 813, n.6a, 532 P.2d at 1232, n.6a, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864, n.6a.
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a court should speak of "comparative fault," thereby focusing on plain-
tiff's conduct. In such cases, however, the courts will have to be quite
precise in their analysis.
In some cases, plaintiff will have misused a product; a woman using a
permanent wave solution is injured because she failed to follow instruc-
tions. It is arguable that in this case the defendant should not be hela
liable at all because, as couched in strict liability terminology, the
product was "not defective." On the other hand, some instances of
misuse are quite foreseeable. For example, one court has held that a
manufacturer of a chair could foresee that purchasers or others might
stand on it; therefore, the manufacturer had the duty to make a chair
that would withstand such a use.56 However, under comparative fault,
plaintiff would not recover his entire damages; the jury would consider
the plaintiff's misuse and reduce damages accordingly.57
A second type of potential defense in strict liability cases is contribu-
tory negligence. It should be noted that California courts appear to
have rejected contributory negligence as a defense in strict liability cases
where plaintiff's conduct consisted of a failure to discover a defect in a
product or an abnormally dangerous activity.5 8  While a number of
reasons have been given for refusing to apply the contributory negli-
gence defense in strict liability cases, the decisions of these courts were
probably based on the modem judicial distrust and dislike of the
defense and an unwillingness to introduce it into a new area. It is
possible, however, that under comparative negligence the California
courts will accept the argument that plaintiffs damages should be
reduced by the amount he was at fault in a products liability case. Thus,
in a case where plaintiff continued to ride on a defective tire that a
reasonable person would have discovered, a jury may ascribe some
quantum of fault to him and his damages would be reduced by that
amount. Case law from other jurisdictions lends support to this proposi-
tion.59
The final basic defense in strict liability cases is assumption of risk. In
California and many other jurisdictions this has remained a defense,
although the burden is on the defendant to establish that the plaintiff
voluntarily encountered a known risk.60 If the defense is established, it
56. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857
(1951).
57. See ScHwArz, supra note 4, §12.4.
58. See Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (ultrahazardous
activity) (dictum); McGoldrick v. Porter Cable Tools, 34 Cal. App. 3d 885, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 481 (1973) (products liability).
59. See Hagenbuch v. Snap-on-Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972).
60. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972).
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is absolute and plaintiff recovers nothing. It is probable that under
comparative fault the Supreme Court of California will hold that plain-
tiff's damages will be apportioned in that situation."' In that regard, in
the case involving the defective tire posed previously, if plaintiff had
examined his tires, realized that they were defective, and continued to
ride on them, he still might have recoverable damages. Nevertheless,
his damages would be reduced, and probably quite substantially, by the
amount that he was at fault. In sum, under comparative fault, the
distinction that is made between contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk in the products area in California may ultimately become a
thing of the past."5
C. Derivative Claims
Of special concern in California will be the impact of comparative
negligence upon derivative claims. In a derivative claim plaintiff is
seeking.to recover damages that he has incurred as a result of a direct
injury that defendant has caused to a third party. If a claim is truly
derivative in nature, however, plaintiff will be subject to all defenses that
could be asserted by the defendant against the injured third party. A
paradigm example is a wrongful death action. Assume that a husband
brings a wrongful death action derived from an automobile accident
wherein his wife was killed while she was driving. Assume further that
her husland was at home at the time. It is clear that if the wife was
contributorily negligent, the husband's claim would have been barred
under prior California law.6" Under comparative negligence, however,
his claim will not be barred, but will be subject to reduction by the
amount his wife was at fault in the accident. 64 However, a derivative
claim can become a bit more complicated. Let us assume that the
husband was in the car at the time of the accident, that he was alert and
looking out of the car windows at night, but that he failed to tell his wife
that she did not have her headlights on. Let us assume further that the
failure to have the headlights on was a cause of the collision with
another car that was being negligently driven by defendant. Finally,
assume that both the husband's and the wife's negligence contributed to
the happening of the accident. In this case, the jury will be required to
apportion an amount of negligence to both the husband and wife. Thus,
if the defendant was speeding at 70 miles per hour and could not stop in
61. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
62. For a discussion of that distinction as it now exists, see Luque v. McLean, 8
Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
63. E.g., Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955).
64. See BAJI, supra note 4, No. 3.53,
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time to avoid the accident, the jury might apportion 40 percent to him,
50 percent to the wife driver, and 10 percent to the husband passenger.
As a result, the husband would recover only 40 percent of his damages
in the wrongful death action.
The author believes that the same approach will be followed in
worker's compensation cases with regard to the rule promulgated by the
California Supreme Court in Witt v. Jackson.8 Under the rule in that
case, an employee's contributory negligence will bar his employer's
worker's compensation carrier from asserting a claim against a third
party wrongdoer who injured the employee. 60 But with comparative
negligence, the carrier's claim will not be barred; it will be reduced by
the amount the employee was at fault. Moreover, if an analogy is made
to wrongful death suits, the carrier's claim will be subject to a further
reduction in the amount that the employer was at fault in the occurrence
of the accident.6 7  For example, suppose the carrier has paid the
employee $10,000 in benefits. In the employee's action against the
third party defendant, the jury finds the employee was 10 percent at
fault, the employer 20 percent at fault, and the third party defendant 70
percent at fault. The carrier will then be able to obtain a $7000
judgment against the defendant by virtue of its subrogation to the
employee's claim against the third party tortfeasor. This approach
appears to be the one taken by the Baji Committee. 68
The same principles of derivative claims will apply with regard to a
parent's claim for past medical expenditures resulting from injuries
negligently inflicted by defendant upon a child. Under prior law,
contributory negligence of a child over five years of age would have
barred recovery.69 Under comparative negligence, the child's negli-
gence will simply reduce the amount of that recovery.70 Further, if the
parents' negligence contributed to the injury of the child, their recovery
for medical expenditures may be reduced by that amount.71
The same result could obtain in a situation similar to that found in the
65. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
66. Id. at 69, 366 P.2d at 647, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
67. Id. at 72, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
68. See BAH, supra note 4, No. 15.13. (Note 11(B) and materials following).
69. E.g., Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959).
70 ....
Contributory negligence, if any, on the part of the minor does not bar a
recovery by him against the defendant but the total amount of damages to
which the minor would otherwise be entitled shall be reduced in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the minor.
The negligence, if any, of the parents, or either of them, does not bar or
reduce recovery of damages for injuries to the minor.
BAH, supra note 4, No. 3.60.
71. See Mattox v. Isley, 111 Cal. App. 2d 774, 245 P.2d 664 (1952).
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landmark California case of Dillon v. Legg.72 Under the principle of
this case, one may be able to recover for emotional harm caused by his
observation of an injury negligently inflicted upon his child or possibly
his spouse. 78 The court in Dillon indicated in dictum that the contribu-
tory negligence of the physically injured party (the child or spouse)
would be imputed to the party seeking recovery for emotional harm;74 in
other words, the claim for emotional harm was derivative in nature.
Hence, with comparative negligence, the relative's claim would be sub-
ject to apportionment if the physicially injured party was contributorily
negligent.
One area where there may be substantial controversy is actions for
loss of consortium.75 If the claim is regarded as nonderivative, that is,
in the nature of a totally independent injury to the plaintiff, there may
be no apportionment where the injured spouse was contributorily negli-
gent. On the other hand, if it is regarded as derivative, and thus similar
to claims for wrongful death, emotional harm, or by parents for past
medical expenses for their injured child, then plaintiff's claim will be
subject to apportionment.70
As the reader has seen, the possible impact of comparative negligence
upon the existing law with regard to derivative claims for damages is
substantial. By virtue of the specialized nature of these claims and the
public policy considerations underlying them, this may offer a fertile
area for legislative pronouncements of what the law shall be after the Li
decision. However, until the legislature does act, it would seem that the
principles espoused in Li should apply to both derivative and direct
claims.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS: SPECIAL VERDICTS
Previous sections of this article have already discussed the procedural
matters of the defendant's right to setoffs77 and his burden of pleading
and proving contributory fault.78 At this juncture, it will be useful to
consider the issue of special verdicts as addressed by the supreme court
in Li. In reference to this device, the court stated that "the utilization of
special verdicts or jury interrogatories can be of invaluable assistance in
assuring that the jury has approached its sensitive and often complex
72. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
73. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
74. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
75. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765 (1975).
76. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 892-93.
77. See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
78. See text following note 20 supra.
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task with proper standards and appropriate reverence." 79 However, in a
footnote, the court made it clear that special verdicts are not mandato-
ry, but will be left to the sound discretion of the trial courts.80 Never-
theless, special verdicts are extraordinarily useful in comparative negli-
gence cases. In drafting the special verdicts there are two basic
questions to be determined by the jury: (1) what percentage of fault
was attributable to each party; and (2) how much damage did ea6h
party suffer? Of particular importance are the cases involving deriva-
tive claims or multiple parties, wherein the comparative negligence
system becomes virtually unworkable if the special verdict procedure is
not utilized.
It is the law of all states that have included a special verdict procedure
in their comparative negligence statute that the judge and not the jury
should compute the amount of damages apportionable to each defend-
ant."' In other words, after the jury determines the percentage of fault
attributable to each party, the judge takes out a pocket calculator and
determines what, for example, is 41 percent of $3175.65. Neverthe-
less, the Baji Committee appears to leave the calculations to the jury.82
Hopefully, the Baji Committee will follow the lead of other states and
reconsider this question, leaving the matter of calculation to the judge.
Probably this issue is one that the legislature should qltimatoly resolve.
Special verdicts are vital to a comparative negligence system because
they afford an opportunity to the litigants to determine what the jury did
and where it may have erred. For example, assume plaintiff's total
damages are $100,000 in a case where he was also at least 60 percent at
fault. If the jury returns a general verdict of $100,000, where did it go
wrong? Did it inflate plaintiff's damages, or did it fail to abide by the
comparative negligence system and acordingly reduce plaintiff's dam-
ages based on his fault? If the jury had been required to return a
special verdict, the defendant's counsel would be able to know what
went wrong and then appeal the verdict on that specific ground.
In a case where the jury has failed to properly allocate a percentage
of fault to the plaintiff, the author advocates that a court should imple-
ment a procedure similar to remittitur and fix the highest jury verdict
that it would uphold and then give the plaintiff the option of accepting
that amount in judgment or face a new trial on all the issues.88 If this
79. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872.
80. Id. at 824 n.18, 532 P.2d at 1240 n.18, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872 n.18.
81. See ScHwA=z, supra note 4, §17.4, at 282-83.
82. See BAJI, supra note 4, No. 14.90 (requiring the jury to make each calculation
and then return a general verdict).
83. See ScawAarz, supra note 4, §18.4.
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procedure is implemented, it will cut down on the number of appeals
on cases tried under a comparative negligence system.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
A. Whose Negligence is to be Considered?
There are numerous and complex problems with regard to cases
involving multiple defendants. One that was alluded to but not resolved
in the Li opinion focuses on whether fault may be allocated to parties
who are not before the court.84 The answer to this question may make
a very practical difference with regard to the amount of damages
recovered by plaintiff. There are a few Wisconsin cases that have dealt
with this situation, indicating that the jury may consider the fault of an
out-of-court party (or parties) and allocate a proper percentage to
him. 85 Thus, if plaintiff, a pedestrian, is injured in a two-car accident
but sues only one driver, that defendant may argue to the jury that a
percentage of fault should be apportioned to the out-of-court party. A
fortiori, this can be done when the out-of-court party has settled.80
On the other hand, an argument can be made that fault should only
be apportioned among the parties who are actually before the court. An
exception could be made in the limited situation where there has been a
settlement. In all other situations, it should be the responsibility of both
plaintiff and defendant to bring before the court all persons whose
conduct has a bearing on the transaction. Clearly, under California law
plaintiff can accomplish this result by the use of procedural joinder.87
This problem is a 'bit more complex with defendants, but it would seem
that the defendant could file a cross complaint against a third party if it
states an independent cause of action arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence. 88 Certainly, the matter is of importance to defendant be-
cause he may want the jury to consider the amount of fault that might
be allocated to this third party. Defendant's basic problem under
California law is that his cross complaint may be limited to a claim for
contribution or indemnity,89 raising procedural difficulties which will be
discussed presently.90 It should be noted here, however, that a careful
84. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 823, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872.
85. See, e.g., Ross v. Koberstein, 220 Wis. 73, 264 N.W. 642 (1936); Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
86. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963) (release of
settling defendant provided for discharge of that percentage of plaintiff's damages caused
by the former).
87. See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§378, 389.
88. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §428.10(b).
39. See CAL. CODE Cr,. PRoc. §428.10(b); see also CAL. CODE CIv. PRoC. §§875 et
seq., 1055.
90. See text accompanying notes 81-89 inlra.
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judgment must always be made by plaintiff and/or defendant in joining
additional parties. For example, if defendant is able to add additional
parties, thereby enabling the jury to consider their respective fault, this
might reduce from the jury's perspective the amount of fault attributable
to plaintiff.
It is possible that the supreme court has already resolved the issue of
whether a jury may consider the negligence or fault of a party who is not
before the court. In its original opinion, the Li court stated that under
comparative negligence liability for damages will be assigned "in direct
proportion to the fault of the persons whose negligence has brought such
damage about."9 However, in its modified opinion of April 24th, the
court changed this language to "in direct proportion to the amount of
negligence of each of the parties."92 The court well may have meant by
this change that apportionment of damages is to be based only on the
fault of the parties before the court and not on that of all persons whose
acts contributed to the cause of the accident. On the other hand, the
Baji Committee did not attribute this intent to the court, and under its
suggested instruction the negligence of all persons will be considered.93
Undoubtedly, this is an issue that will have to be expressly resolved by
the supreme court in some future case.
B. Joint and Several Liability
Under basic tort law, when two or more persons combine expressly or
impliedly and act in concert to injure another, they will be deemed joint
tortfeasors. The joint tortfeasor concept also includes those whose
independent acts of negligence are a substantial cause of an indivisible
injury to another. In either case each joint tortfeasor will be jointly and
severally liable for the entire damage caused to the victim.94 Will
comparative negligence change this well-established policy of tort law?
A reason that might prompt -the change is that a jury will now allocate
specific percentages of fault among the tortfeasors, thus providing a
reliable method of dividing the damages among multiple defendants.
91. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (emphasis
added). The opinion cited as 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 is the
Li opinion as modified. There is no official citation for the original opinion in Li. The
original opinion (L.A. 30277, March 31, 1975) may be referred to for purposes of
comparison.
92. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 14 Cal. 3d 103a, 103c, modifying 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (emphasis added). Copies of the original and
modifying opinions presently can only be found in the paperbound advance sheets of the
CALIFORNrA OFFIcIAL REPORTS. As mentioned in note 91, supra, the opinion now
appearing at 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 is the modified opinion.
93. See BAJI, supra note 4, No. 14.90.
94. PROSSER, supra note 4, §52.
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Hence, a defendant can argue that he should only be liable for the
amount of damages ascribed to him individually by the jury.
In most jurisdictions that have adopted a comparative negligence
system, the doctrine of joint and several liability has remained un-
changed. It has been modified or abolished only in jurisdictions where
that step was specifically taken by the legislature." In light of the fact
that joint and several liability is likely to remain in most comparative
negligence jurisdictions, a rather shocking hypothetical has been dis-
cussed by some commentators. They pose a plaintiff who was 10
percent negligent, defendant A who was 85 percent negligent, and
defendant B who was 5 percent negligent. Assuming that defendants A
and B are joint tortfeasors, they note, plaintiff can recover 90 percent of
his damages from defendant B. This result could not have obtained
before the introduction of comparative negligence because plaintiff's
claim would have been barred by his own contributory negligence. Of
course, even under a contributory negligence system, had plaintiff not
been at fault at all, he still could have recovered his entire damages
against B even though the proportion of fault between A and B was
substantially different.
The one fundamental problem with this so-called shocking hypotheti-
cal is that it is extremely hard to imagine this situation ever occurring in
fact. Joint tortfeasors are almost always relatively equal in degree of
fault, for recall that joint tortfeasors either have to act in concert, or they
must all substantially and negligently cause an indivisible injury. If a
situation arose where one tortfeasor's culpable conduct was only five
percent of the total picture, a very strong defense argument could be
made that that individual's act was not a cause in fact at all, thereby
avoiding the whole concept of joint and several liability. In sum,
comparative negligence should not affect the concept of joint and several
liability except in those cases where plaintiff would have been barred
from recovery against any tortfeasor by contributory negligence.
C. Comparison of Negligence Among Defendants
1. Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
The common law doctrine prohibiting contribution among joint tort-
feasors has been modified by statute in California.9" This statutory
inroad upon the common law rule is quite restrictive, however, allowing
contribution only when a money judgment has been rendered jointly
95. E.g., KAN. STATS. ANN. §60-258a(d) (1974).
96. See CAL. CoDE CIV. PRoC. §§875-880.
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against two or more defendants. 97 In that regard, it has been held that
a defendant's cross complaint under Section 875 of the Code of Civil
Procedure does not state a cause of action for contribution where there
has not been a money judgment rendered against the cross defendant. 9
Decisions of this type are totally discordant with the needs of a compara-
tive negligence system, for recall that the jury under a special verdict
procedure will allocate fault among the parties.99 Moreover, it is easier
for the jury to do this if all the parties who caused harm are before the
court. In sum, in order for comparative negligence to work properly, a
defendant should be able to assert a contribution claim prior to judg-
ment by way of a cross complaint under Section 428.10(b). Unfortu-
nately, the phraseology of this statute, drafted before comparative negli-
gence became the law in California, prevents a defendant from doing so.
Therefore, in order to fully implement the comparative negligence
system, the legislature should amend that section to allow a defendant to
bring into the case other potential tortfeasors that plaintiff has failed to
name in his complaint.
One other troublesome provision of the California contribution stat-
ute provides that when a contribution claim is allowed damages will be
allocated on a pro rata basis. In plain English, this statute calls for an
equal division of damages among joint tortfeasors, regardless of the
amount of fault actually attributable to each.10 This position of the
statute is also out of harmony with the principle and spirit of a pure
comparative negligence system, wherein damages are to be allocated on
the basis of the relative fault or negligence of the parties, not upon an
equal division.
2. Indemnity
Under California law, a defendant can bring a cross complaint for
noncontractual indemnity in order to be reimbursed by a third party for
the damages he will have to pay to plaintiff.10' The right to indemnity,
however, is an all-or-nothing remedy: if defendant is successful in his
cross complaint, he will recover the entire damages that he has to pay
plaintiff. Because of this "all-or-nothing rule," California courts have
given a very restrictive scope to noncontractual indemnity. The cross
complainant must show that he did not actively or affirmatively partici-
97. See CAL. CODE CiV. PRoc. §875.
98. General Elec. Co. v. State of Calif., 32 Cal. App. 3d 918, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543
(1973).
99. See text accompanying notes 77-83 supra.
100. See CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. §876.
101. See 3 B. WrriiN, CALuFoRNA PRocEDuRm, Pleading §777 (2d ed. 1971); 4 B.
WrrEIN, SuMMARY oF CALiFoRNIA LAW, Torts §50 (8th ed. 1974).
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pate in the wrong and that he could have done nothing to avoid it at the
time plaintiff was injured. 102 As an appellate court noted in the case of
Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc.:10 3
The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary
and secondary liability of two persons each of whom is made re-
sponsible by the law to an injured party. . . . The difference
between primary and secondary liability is not based on a difference
in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negli-
gence,-a doctrine which, indeed, is not recognized by the common
law. .. . It depends on a difference in the character or kind of
the wrongs which cause the injury.1 04
In sum, indemnity as it exists in California will not be very helpful to
defendant in bringing other parties into a comparative negligence suit.
3. A Possible Judicial Solution
The California approaches to contribution and indemnity had been
criticized even prior to the Li case.' 05 That criticism becomes even
stronger in light of the Li decision. However, there is a possible escape
from the restrictive California contribution statute'0 6 which California
courts may find useful. Specifically, the situation confronting Califor-
nia also occurred in New York. Under the New York statute, which is
remarkably similar to the California statute, a contribution claim was
allowed only when plaintiff had already obtained a judgment against
defendant; furthermore, allocation of damages could only be made on a
pro rata basis.1°7
In a somewhat remarkable feat of judicial "lawmaking," the New
York Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.10 attempted to
resolve the problem created by the New York statute. In Dole, one of
two "wrongdoers" sought an indemnity claim prior to judgment against
the other. The court permitted the claim even though the parties were
not totally disparate in terms of their respective fault, under the label of
"indemnity," but it changed the nature of that remedy.' The court
held that in a noncontractual indemnity action, damages could be
102. See People v. Daly City Scavenger Co., 19 Cal. App. 3d 277, 281, 96 Cal. Rptr.
669, 671 (1971).
103. 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 98 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1972).
104. Id. at 696-97, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04.
105. See, e.g., Werner, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CAL. L. RnV.
490 (1959); Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among loint Torifeasors, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 728, 737-47 (1968).
106. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §875.
107. N.Y.C.P.L.RL §1401 (McKinney 1963).
108. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972).
109. Id. at 150-51, 282 N.E.2d at 292.
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allocated on the basis of the relative fault of the parties; in other words,
under a system of pure comparative negligence.110 This holding thus
permitted a defendant to assert a cross claim that, in effect, was one for
contribution prior to judgment, notwithstanding the language of the
New York statute. If the defendant employed that device, however, he
could not utilize the contribution statute after judgment. In actuality,
the New York court allowed contribution prior to judgment and permit-
ted damages to be allocated among the defendants on the basis of their
relative fault.
The New York Court of Appeals adopted this unique approach to
indemnity when the state had not yet enacted a comparative negligence
statute. Obviously, the introduction of comparative negligence creates
an additional reason why a court should utilize this approach for alloca-
tion of damages among joint tortfeasors. The reasoning in the Dole
case would, to some degree, contradict the language of the California
contribution statute. However, that statute is not phrased in terms of an
exclusive remedy, and after all, the rule precluding contribution among
joint tortfeasors is of common law origin and could be judicially
changed the same way the contributory negligence rule was changed by
Li. In fact, the same common law reluctance to apportion damages
underlies both the contributory negligence defense and the rule prohibit-
ing contribution among joint tortfeasors. Assuming that California
were to follow the Dole rationale, a defendant should be able to assert a
cross complaint for "indemnity" prior to judgment against a joint tort-
feasor, and hence damages could be divided according to the relative
fault of the parties defendant. Of course, the best way to achieve this
desired result would be, as mentioned previously, the adoption of appro-
priate legislation.
TRIAL STRATEGIES FOR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL
A. Considerations for Plaintiffs Counsel
With the adoption of the comparative negligence system, plaintiff's
counsel must obtain a new perspective in the planning and trial of his
case. He must marshal the facts to show that plaintiff's negligence was
in fact minor in comparison to the defendant's. In some situations, the
plaintiff has only been negligent with regard to his own safety, whereas
the defendant was negligent with regard to the safety of others. If this
can be demonstrated, the jury may consider the defendant's disregard
for the safety of others far more culpable than plaintiff's misconduct and
110. Id.
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thus make the appropriate apportionment of fault. In addition, if
plaintiff's counsel has done his job in conveying the nature and extent of
plaintiff's injury to the jury, the reduction of damages may be minimized,
as a very wide latitude is given to the jury in allocating fault in
comparative negligence jurisdictions.
Although the doctrine of last clear chance is abolished, its underlying
concept can be used in the closing argument. Plaintiff's counsel can
stress to the jury that the defendant could have avoided the entire
accident if he had only acted reasonably when he had the chance. While
this will not provide plaintiff with total recovery of his damages, it
might help him with the jury in terms of apportionment.
Plaintiff's counsel will also be able to find some Wisconsin cases
indicating that a plaintiff should not be deemed more negligent than the
defendant simply because his acts of negligence were greater in
number."" Similarly, there are other Wisconsin cases indicating that
negligence is not "equal" simply because it is similar in kind.n 2 In the
appropriate situation, plaintiff's counsel may be able to request an
instruction to the jury based on these decisions.
B. Considerations for Defendant's Counsel
Defense counsel must realize and believe that comparative negligence
is not as devastating a doctrine for defendants as some literature pub-
lished by the defense bar has suggested. For example, comparative
negligence appeals to the jury's sense of fairness much more than the
contributory negligence defense does. As every trial lawyer knows,
juries often ignore the contributory negligence defense and sometimes
give plaintiff almost a total verdict when he does not deserve it. On the
other hand, juries do not ignore comparative negligence. Throughout
the trial, defense counsel should bring home the facts that show plaintiff
was at fault in causing the accident. Then, in his summation, he should
stress -the fairness of a system that does not impose on his client the entire
cost of an accident when his client was not entirely at fault. In addition,
defense counsel should impress upon the jury that as concerned citizens
and responsible jurors they must look beyond the damage plaintiff
suffered in allocating fault between the parties. As a result, a defend-
ant's attorney may find that the juries have followed his lead. The
defendant will also be helped by special verdicts, which require the jury
to focus on the question of relative fault of both plaintiff and defendant
111. E.g., Lovesee v. Allied Dev. Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 340, 345, 173 N.W.2d 196, 199
(1970); Taylor v. W. Cas. & Surety Co., 270 Wis. 408, 411, 71 N.W.2d 363, 365 (1955).
112. E.g., Hansberry v. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626, 284 N.W. 556 (1939).
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in separate findings. Hence, it is much more difficult for the jury to
ignore the plaintiff's acts which have contributed to his own injury.
Although implied assumption of risk is no longer an absolute defense,
the facts underlying that concept may cause jurors to allocate a high
percentage of fault to the plaintiff. Defense counsel should stress the
facts where appropriate emphasizing that the plaintiff voluntarily en-
countered a known risk, and that in terms of fault, the responsibility for
the accident is overwhelmingly that of the plaintiff, not the defendant.
In addition, defense counsel may be able to use the concept of proximate
cause to avoid liability altogether if there has been a situation where
defendant's negligence was extremely remote. Of course, if the jury
ignores defendant's pleas and irrationally apportions fault, defense coun-
sel should begin a process of appeal on that specific ground. In
summary, while the situation was better for defendants under the contri-
butory negligence defense, pure comparative negligence does not present
an impossible situation.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to present an overview of the
possible impact of comparative negligence in light of existing California
law. Obviously, each major problem addressed herein could be the
subject matter of an entire article. Nevertheless, it is important to
convey the message that it will be of great advantage to both the client
and the attorney if the latter will reconsider preexisting tort doctrine
after the Li decision.
Many of the issues raised here must ultimately be resolved by the
California judiciary and legislature. However, until this final resolu-
tion, the emerging law of comparative negligence affords an attorney the
opportunity to argue what the law should be, rather than having to
accept what the law already is. In other words, new law will have to be
made before California's system of comparative negligence becomes
firmly established. Hopefully, this article has provided some insight as
to the factors which must be considered in making this new law.
